Revisionist Historiography and Rhetorical Tradition(s), A Brief Note

The rhetorical tradition used to be something we could talk about in a cool way. It was our history. But some people didn’t like the term tradition. Tradition, Sutton believes, promotes uniformity, consistency, while excluding “the rare, the exception, the unique” (qtd. in Graff and Leff 12).

The history of rhetoric “is itself a rhetorical achievement” (12). But tradition doesn’t have to be a bad word, and it brings with it important considerations. We need a tradition from which to measure our innovations. And without a tradition, we lack a collective identity.

We need a sense of tradition that is both stable and flexible. The tradition should also be pedagogical.

Baldwin is cited as saying that everything after Aristotle was decline. Then we have Walter saying that classical rhetoric is interesting because of its “different starting points, its myriad assumptions, its contrasting aims” (qtd. in Graff and Leff 14) which, as stated on page 14, consist of

·         the metaphysical (Protagoras and Plato)

·         the social (Isocrates and Cicero)

·         the epistemological (Descartes, Locke, Campbell)

·         the educational-ethical (Quintilian)

·         the theological (Augustine)

·         the esthetic (Blair)

·         the logical (Whately)

·         and the psychological (Winans)

In short, some notion of tradition is desirable—otherwise, how do we have an intellectual community?

Pedagogy is sensitive to the whole, but also sensitive to the one. We all teach and need to, but teaching is individual. Not just one person, but one time and place, too.

Pedagogy is what we have in common. It is also the theory combined with the practice.

From Richard Graff and Michael Leff. 2005. “Revisionist Historiography and Rhetorical Tradition(s).” The Viability of the Rhetorical Tradition. Ed. Richard Graff, Arthur E. Walzer, and Janet M. Atwill. 11-30.